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DISCRETIONARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
NLRB UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT*
THE National Labor Relations Board has power to adjudicate labor disputes
"affecting commerce" coterminous with Congress' own authority to regulate
commerce.1 But the Board has never attempted to exercise this power to the
legal limit. Instead, it has declined jurisdiction over some industries or
disputes on the ground that they are "essentially local in character"2 and
that to assert jurisdiction would not "effectuate the purposes or policies of
the act."3
By making certain union activities unfair labor practices, 4 however, the
* Joliet Contractors Association v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952).
1. The general constitutional theory is that the statutory language "affecting com-
merce" gives to the administrative agency the broadest grant of power possible under the
Constitution. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939) (commerce power extends
to clothing industry)-, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 205 (1938)
(public utility); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31, 34-7 (1937)
(steel manufacturer). See also Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Econoty,
1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. Rv. 645, 883, at 670-2, 679-85, 905-07, 909-25, 945-7 (1946).
2. Under the original Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1946),
the Board generally declined jurisdiction over industries essentially local in character: Mc-
Donald Cooperative Dairy Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 552 (1944) (dairy industry); Yellow Cab &
Baggage Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 469 (1939) (local taxicab company); Remington Rand, Inc.,
27 N.L.R.B. 488 (1940) (service division of interstate corporation) ; Hotel Ass'n of St.
Louis, 92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951) (reaffirming 15-year policy of denying jurisdiction in
hotel industry) ; Chicago Motor Coach Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 890 (1945) (local transit line) ;
Cousins Tractor Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 857 (1947) (local sales and service agency) ; S. & R.
Baking Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 351 (1946) (bakery); Hubby-Reese Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 1404
(1947) (wholesale grocery); Brown & Root, 51 N.L.R.B. 820 (1943) (construction
industry); Johns-Manville, 61 N.L.R.B. 1 (1945) (construction). But cf. Brown Ship-
building Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 326 (1944) (jurisdiction accepted in case involving construction
workers regularly employed in shipyard).
For extensive summaries of industries within and without the pale of federal regula-
tion, see Walsh, "Local Bu.siness," 1 LAB. L.J. 783 (1950) ; Schwartz, Local Business-
No Man's Land in Labor Relations 1 LAB. L.J. 189 (1949); Feldblum, Jurisdictional
"Tideland.s" in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 114 (1952).
3. This position has been upheld in the past by courts. In Haleston Drug Stores v.
NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951) (upholding
Board's rejection of jurisdiction over chain stores, where union petitioning for election),
the Ninth Circuit said that the Board could, "for reasons of policy or for budgetary or
for other reasons," decline jurisdiction after a complaint had issued. See NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Construe. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951) ("[T]he Board sometimes
properly declines to [take jurisdiction] stating that the policies of the act would not be
effectuated in that case," even though the activities affect commerce), And see NLRB v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 (1941).
4. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Supp. 1952). The Act makes illegal
the following union -practices: coercion of employees or employers; discrimination against
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Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 5 complicated the problem of NLRB jurisdiction.
Now the Board was forced to handle additional problems in the industries
that it had previously regulated. Furthermore, some of the newly-illegal union
practices existed primarily in areas where formerly the Board had refused to
exercise jurisdiction.6 If the NLRB had continued its previous jurisdictional
policy, many of the new proscriptions would have been rendered meaningless.
On the other hand, if the Board had accepted all cases involving such union
unfair labor practices, the increased case-load would have been far greater
than it could handle.
7
Because Congress had provided no new guide for the exercise of NLRB
authority,s the Board, in a series of unanimous decisions in October of 1950,
an employee; failure to bargain collectively; secondary boycotts and jurisdictional dis-
putes; excessive union dues; and featherbedding. Section 158(a) (3) bans the closed
shop. The role of the Board was thus changed from that of a booster of organized labor
to a mediator between labor and management. See NLRB, LExisLAV1 HISTOny r TIM
LABOR MANAGm I_,T RELATIOxS AcT OF 1947, passim (1948) (hereinafter citcd as Lvis-
LATIvE HISTORY); InT.s & Browx, FROT THE W.vrx Acr oTo TAvTr-HtarUrty
271, 314-15, 655-65, c.12 (1950) (hereinafter cited as Ma.is). See also Title II of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STrxT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 17142 (Supp.
1952), establishing the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, particularly 29 U.S.C.
§ 171 (Supp. 1952) (declaration of purpose and policy).
5. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STrT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141
(Supp. 1952).
6. Prior to Taft-Hartley, the Board, for example, had refused to assert control over
the building trades because of the segmentation of th2 industry, the interstate, intermit-
tent and migratory character of the work, and the fact that unions there w: ere already
well-entrenched. But in this industry, newly-illegal union practices-such as jurisdictional
disputes, secondary boycotts, and featherbedding-were notoriously common. See, Cov-
ington, Jurisdiction of the Nrational Labor Relations Board ocr the Building and Con-
struction Industry, 28 N.C.L. Rnv. 1, 2 (1949); Comment, The Impact of the Taft-
Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 "YMUZ L.J. 673, 674 (1951) ;
Rosenthal, Labor Board Jurisdiction over the Building and Construction IndustrT, 3 LA.
LJ. 7 (1952). See also Munus 401-02.
7. See notes 31 and 35 infra.
S. The original National Labor Relations Act, or Vagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935),
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1946), stated: "The Board is empowercd ... to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting commerce." (Emphasis added).
The Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. 1952), makes
no change. Courts generally have seized on this language to justify the discretionary
jurisdiction of the Board. In Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 1S7 F2d 413, 421 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951), the court stated that "[b]y the express language
of § 10(a) [29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. 1952)] the Board was and still is eopowe-rcd
(not directed) to prevent persons from engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce. Its discretionary authority in respect of its assertion of jurisdiction was never,
so far as we are informed, questioned under the act as it existed prior to 1947." Se" also
NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, 268-9 (3d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 314
U.S. 693 (1941). And see Goodman & Griggs, Jurisdiction of NLRB Under Self-lmposed
Limitations, 50 MIcia. I. REv. 899 (1952).
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announced jurisdictional yardsticks applicable to all industries. 9 The Board
would hear only those disputes likely to affect defense production or to lead
to a serious interruption in the flow of goods in commerce. And the impact
on commerce would be measured by the dollar volume of transactions through
interstate channels by the company or companies involved. In no sense were
these standards intended to define the legal limits of the Board's power to
hear disputes. Rather, the Board explicitly declared that budgetary and man-
power limitations made it impossible to exercise its full power.10 The yard-
sticks were designed to avoid an unmanageable case-load and to provide pre-
dictability of jurisdiction."
9. The Board will normally assert jurisdiftion if a dispute involves any one of the
following:
(a) Instrumentalities and channels of commerce, interstate or foreign. W.B.S.R,
Inc., 91 N.L.MB. 630 (1950).
(b) Public utility and transit systems. Local Transit Lines, 91 N.L.R.B. 623 (1950).
(c) Establishments operating as an integral part of a multistate enterprise. The
Borden Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 628 (1950).
(d) Enterprises producing or handling goods destined for out-of-state shipment valued
at $25,000 a year, or performing services outside the state in which the firm is located,
valued at $25,000 a year. Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 618 (1950).
(e) Enterprises furnishing goods or services of $50,000 a year or more to concerns
in categories (a), (b), or (d). Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950).
(f) Enterprises with a direct inflow of goods or materials valued at $500,000. Fed-
eral Dairy, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 638 (1950).
(g) Enterprises with an indirect inflow of goods or materials from out-of-state
valued at $1,000,000 a year. Dorn's House of Miracles, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 632 (1950).
(h) Enterprises having such a combination of inflow or outflow of goods or services,
coming within categories (d), (e), (f), or (g), that the percentage of each of these
categories, in which there is activity, taken together add up to 100. The Rutledge Paper
Products, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 625 (1950).
(i) Establishments substantially affecting the national defense. Westport Moving &
Storage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 902 (1950).
Part of the impetus for this type of yardstick came from Congress. See SEN. REP. No.
986 IT. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948), where the "Watchdog Committee," established
pursuant to Title IV of the Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 191-7 (Supp. 1952),
stated: "The most obvious approach, if the jurisdiction of the Board is to be clearly
defined, is a mathematical one. The number of persons employed and the volume in
dollar value in sales to out-of-state customers are facts which may be ascertained with
accuracy." Thus, the suggestion that jurisdictional standards be couched in dollar terms
came directly from that Congressional group charged with reporting on the administration
of the Act. The Committee, mpra, at 14, also stated: "The committee believes that small
local businesses, retail and service establishments, should not be subject to the act."
For a general review of the application of these criteria, see 16 NLRB ANN. Rra,. e. 2
(1951); Shankin, How NLRB Has Applied Its Jurisdictional Standards, 3 LAD. L.J.
391 (1952) ; Comment, 50 Micra. L. Rav. 899 (1952).
10. See notes 9 supra and 19 infra. See also testimony of Paul M. Herzog, Board
Chairman, Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 174-7 (1949); Hearings before House Subcommittee on Approprialions, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-32 (1951).
11. Predictability of jurisdiction was felt to be particularly important for employers
and employees coming under regulation for the first time, so that they could know
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Joliet Contractors Association v. NLRB 12 throws doubt upun the NLRB'
authority to decline jurisdiction, in any part of the building trades at least,
when a dispute falls within the federal commerce power. With one judge
dissenting, the Seventh Circuit commanded the Board to hear on its merits a
secondary boycott complaint. The boycott had arisen frum the refusal by
union employees of a glazing sub-contractor to work on jobs where pre-
glazed window sash had been installed, thereby forcing the general cuntractor
to stop using pre-glazed sash.13
The NLRB had faced a dilemma in the Joliet situation. The Taft-Hartley
Act had made illegal certain practices particularly prevalent in the construc-
tion industry-secondary boycotts, 14 jurisdictional strikes,1
3 and feather-
bedding.', But prior to the Act, although recognizing its own power to dtal
with the industry, the Board had refrained from exercising jurisdiction on the
ground that the activities were essentially local.' 7 Now the Board was fi trced
to decide whether Congress intended it to hear all cases involving such
practices or to apply to the construction industry the sane discretionary
standards that it used in other industries. In choosing the latter alternative,
a majority of the NLRB recognized that the cumbined interstate operations
of the "primary" and -secondary" employers had a sufficient absolute effect
beforehand whether they might include a closed shop provision in their contracts. See
SEx. RE'. No. 936, rr. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
12. 193 F2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952), 100 U. OF Px. L. R=-. 1261. The Board's decision,
refusing to assert jurisdiction, is reported sub nowa. Glaziers' Union Local No. 27, 90
N.L.R.B. 542 (1950).
13. Open and pre-glazed sash were purchased and installed by the general contractor.
The glazing sub-contractor furnished the glass and labor to complete the glazing on the
open sash. When the open sash was not glazed, all work on the project ceased, as lathers,
plasterers, painters, plumbers, and electricians refuse to work on jobs after November, if
windows are not finished. The general contractor, the secondary employer, vras thus faced
with the alternative of either using pre-glazed sash and not employing union labor, or
using union glaziers and foregoing use of pre-glazed sash. Stipulation of the parties
before the Trial Eaminer, cited in Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833, Q33
(1952).
The Union's by-laws, Article XVI, section 1, forbade members "to glaze any sash
for any building in the course of construction or repair . . . in the w.-arehouse of any
glazing contractor. All sash and glazing work must be done on each respective job site
or building." Glaziers' Union Local No. 27, 90 N.L.R.B. 542, 549 (1950). The trial
Examiner found the goal of this clause, providing as much work as possible for its
members, a legitimate objective. Id. at 554. But the Trial Ex-aminer found further that
to use the by-laws and working rules "as an aid in the enforcement of a secordary boy-
cot" was a violation of the Act. Id. at 558.
14. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)(4)(D) (Supp. 1952). Lxms&Tn
HisToRy 1347-70.
15. 61 STAr. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1952) ; M1uus 455-67;
LEGIsLAV HiszoR , Pasim.
16. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (6) (Supp. 1952); Mu1us 476-0;
LEGisLATw HIsToaY 1544-5, 1570-1, 1623-4.
17. See note 2 supra.
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upon commerce to give the Board power to hear the dispute.18 But as com-
pared with other cases, they felt that the commerce effect was relatively insub-
stantial.19 Although the decision was actually rendered prior to the formaliza-
tion of the 1950 yardsticks, it was thus grounded upon the same rationale as
those standards. Board member Reynolds, however, dissented on the ground
that Congress had intended special treatment for the construction industry.
While recognizing that the Board had discretion to deny jurisdiction, he felt
that as a matter of policy it should not restrict its jurisdiction over this
industry by the usual commerce criteria.
20
In reversing the Board, the Seventh Circuit appears to have rested its
decision in part upon a policy of special treatment for the building trades. The
court supported this portion of its opinion by relying upon sources pointing to
repeated references in Taft-Hartley's legislative history to undesirable tactics
18. Brief for NLRB, pp. 17-27, Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833
(7th Cir. 1952).
19. Glaziers' Union Local No. 27, 90 N.L.R.B. 542, 543 (1950). See also Brief for
NLRB, pp. 17-27, Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952). The
Board had also stated previously that "the factor of aggregate effect on commerce is
relevant in establishing the Board's plenary commerce power under the Act. It is not,
however, determinative of the question of whether jurisdiction should be exercised in any
given case." William G. Churches, 90 N.L.R.B. 378, 380 n.4 (1950). In denying jurisdic-
tion in a dairy industry case, the Board stated: "In the past, we have concluded that,
in cases of this kind, an interruption of such inflow by a labor dispute-though the volume
of out-of-state purchases be substantial-would not be likely to have a sufficient impact
upon interstate commerce to justify an already burdened Federal Board in expending
time, energy, and public funds. In the light of more than 3 years' experience under the
amended Act and the Board's current budget and case load, we now conclude that, al-
though it would effectuate the policies of the statute to assert jurisdiction in cases of this
kind where the direct inflow is substantial, due regard for these factors requires that
we continue to decline jurisdiction where the direct inflow is less than $500,000 in value
annually." Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 638, 639 (1950). See note 9 supra.
Over the course of its operation under Taft-Hartley, the Board has adopted the short-
hand phrase, "would not effectuate the purposes or policies of the Act," Glaziers' Union
Local No. 27, 90 N.L.R.B. 542, 543 (1950), to take the place of repetitive discussions of
the lack of time and money available to handle all matters "affecting commerce." The
Seventh Circuit, in the principal case, failed to read behind this encapsulated expression,
and thereby overlooked its real meaning. See note 29 infra.
The Board's counting method under the yardsticks in secondary boycotts is explained
fully in Jamestown Builders Exchange, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 386, 387 (1951), where the
Board said: "[I]n determining whether the Board will assert jurisdiction in cases in which
secondary boycotts are alleged, we must consider not only the operations of the primary
employer, but also the operations of any second [sic] employers, to the extent that the
latter are affected by the conduct involved. . . . If, taken together, the business of the
primary and that portion of the secondary employers' business which is affected by the
alleged boycott meet the minimum standards, jurisdiction ought to be asserted." And see
Forkosch, NLRB's New Jurisdictional Rule in Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 247 (1951).
20. Board member Reynolds' dissent in the Joliet case, 90 N.L.R.B. 542, 544 (1950),
adopts in toto his dissent in William G. Churches, 90 N.L.R.B. 378, 382 (1950).
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in that industry. 2' But there is actually nothing in the Act's legislative history
to suggest that unfair practices in the construction industry were to be treated
differently from those in other industries.2 In fact, other illegal union practices,
which cut across all industries-such as coercion of workers or refusal to bargain
collectively s--are no less important and thus seem entitled to equal priority. -2 4
But the Seventh Circuit's major ground for reversing the NLRB was the
court's finding that the Joliet boycott actually involved a "substantial" effect
upon commerce.2 5 Although only four contractors had been directly affected
by this dispute, the court pointed out that the union's unfair practices were
in reality aimed at all contractors in the Joliet, Illinois, area.2 0 Then, relying
upon cases upholding the NLRB's power to hear disputes because the effect
on commerce was sustantial,2- the court found that the commerce effect of this
dispute was also substantial..2 1 By refusing to take jurisdiction, the Board
had abused its discretion.
21. Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833, 841, 843-4 (7th Cir. 1952).
See notes 14-16 mtpra.
22. LEGISLATIVE HisTOry makes no mention of the Board's custom of refusing to
accept jurisdiction over certain industries. It does, however, make continued reference to
specified labor practices which should be outlawed, such as the secondary boycott-
common in the trucking industry and garment trades, as well as in the construction in-
dustry. But following the 1947 Act, both House and Senate committees expressed ap-
proval of the general policy of discretionary refusals. SEN. R. No. 986, FT. 3, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11-14 (1948) ; H.R. REP. No. 1852, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (190).
23. These practices are illegal under Taft-Hartley. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (Supp. 1952).
24. Charges of coercion, discrimination, refusal to bargain, and featherbedding, against
a union under 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1), (2), (3), (5) and (6)
(Supp. 1952), constituted about seventy-five percent of all union unfair practice charges.
16 NLRB ANN. REP. 297 (1951). The construction industry fell just at the average,
with manufacturing slightly above, and mining and transportation slightly below, the
average. Figures for the previous years under Taft-Hartley show similar percentage
and distribution figures. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 224 (1950), 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 162
(1949), 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 102 (1948).
25. Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F2d 833, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1952).
26. Id. at 839. All such contractors were members of the Joliet Contractors Associa-
tion-a non-profit Illinois corporation composed of some twenty-tvo general contractors
engaged in the construction and repair of industrial, commercial, and residential buildings,
and some forty-four specialty or sub-contractors. The Association includes in its membr-
ship two glazing contractors who install glass and perform all of the glazing services in
building construction in Joliet and vicinity, generally under sub-contracts with general
contractors. Id. at 834.
27. E.g., Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 643 (1944) (insurance);
NLIRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939) (garment manufacturing) ; United States
v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs.' Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) (anti-trust injunction
granted). Such cases prove only that the Board could, if it chose, regulate these industries
-a point which the Board conceded from the outset. Glaziers' Union Local No. 27, 90
N.L.R.B. 542, 543 (1950). See note 18 supra.
28. Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 1952).
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The court's finding of a substantial effect on commerce would undoubtedly
have been correct had the issue been whether the Board had power over the
dispute. But the Board was concerned only with the relative substantiality
of impact of the immediate controversy. This the court failed to recognize; "
its opinion rehearses much of the semantic struggling of the Supreme Court
a decade ago to sketch the outer limits of the federal commerce power,00
without meeting the more fundamental problem of the daily implementation
of the Act by the Board.
The real problem facing the board is its inability to hear all labor disputes
which fall within the legal limits of its authority.!1 Already burdened with
a backlog of 6,000 cases,3 2 the Board, under the Seventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion, would be obliged to increase its case-load even further. Cases are now
presented to the Board when its General Counsel issues a complaint based on
an unfair labor practice.33 Heretofore, these complaints have been issued with
29. "The Board makes another argument which we think is without merit. In its
brief it states: Where the cut-off point will be set depends on a number of factors, which
not only fluctuate, but are best evaluated by the Board itself-e.g., the size of the Board's
appropriation, the number of cases anticipated, the expected proportion of representation
to complaint cases, and the concentration of these cases in various industries.'
"None of the reasons thus stated were assigned by the Board as a basis for dismissal
of the complaint. It was dismissed upon the Board's conclusion that the impact on com-
merce was insubstantial." Id. at 844. But see note 19 supra, indicating that the Board did
in fact adopt such a position.
This statement may be seized upon as a convenient escape for a court unwilling to
upset the Board's discretionary denial of jurisdiction, where the Board, in its decision, has
spelled out these practical administrative considerations. But the statement seems in-
consistent with the Joliet court's general view that the Board has little or no discretion
to refuse jurisdiction if there is "substantial effect" on commerce in constitutional terms.
Cf. the court's statement: "The unfair labor activities shown and found had a substantial
effect upon commerce. . . . Such being the case, we think the Board was without dis-
cretionary authority to dismiss the complaint." Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193
F.2d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 1952).
In Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 868 (1951), the Seventh Circuit itself recognized the fact that the Board must base its
decision to act not only on the theoretical conclusion which gives it power, but with equal
regard for its available funds and manpower. In sustaining the Board's refusal to take
jurisdiction over a coal mining enterprise, the court noted that "the question [of sub-
stantial effect] relates not to the existence of the federal power but to the propriety of
its exertion in a given state of facts." See also NLRB v. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 144
(9th Cir. 1952).
30. See note 27 supra.
31. Even under the 1950 standards, supra note 9, the Board has been unable to keep
abreast of its case load. In 1951, the Board was 6,375 cases behind. 16 NLRB AtN. Rr.
291 (1951). Similar figures for the years since Taft-Hartley are: 1950-6,714; 1949-
5,722; 1948-12,642. Statistics from the NLRB's annual reports for 1950, 1949, and 1948
respectively.
32. Ibid.
33. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (Supp. 1952). "[The General Counsel]
shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges
and issuance of complaints under section 160."
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regard for the Board policy of hearing only important disputes.3 An4 this
approach does not seem to have unjustly discriminated a.ainst the building
trades.35 In fact, the Board has declined jurisdiction in only five of the more
34. Except for the term of General Counsel George N. Denham, July, 1947-
September, 1950, complaints have been issued only in those matters where it is likely that
the Board will assert jurisdiction. Under the Wagner Act, this policy was facilitated
by placing the General Counsel subordinate to the Board. Taft-Hartley, however,
separated the prosecution functions of the General Counsel into a separate office. 61 STAw.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. 1952). But cf. Haleston Drug Stores .v. XLRB,
187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), ccrt. denied. 342 U.S. 815 (1951) (Board l'as final authority
to dismiss complaint after issuance). The present General Counsel, George J. Bott, is
apparently more willing to abide by the Board's announced jurisdictional policy than was
his predecessor, 'Mr. Denham. Forkosch, NLRB's New Jrisdictional Rule in Sccondary
Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 247, 253 (1951) ; Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, supra, at 4"2 n.5;
DAvis, ADxINSI5TRATIvE LANW 40-12 (1951).
For Congressional reaction to Denham's extension of control, see H.R. REP. No. 1852,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10(1950): "It is evident from the size of the Board, and the staff
allotted, and the budget considerations adopted by the Congress, that it was not contem-
plated that the jurisdiction of the agency was to be developed to the untowvard degree
advanced by the General Counsel [Denham]." See SEN. r m. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 37-43 (1949); SENz. REP. No. 99, r. 2, S1st Cong., 1st Sess. S (1949); Hearings
before Subcon ittees of Committees on Education and Labor, and Expenditures in the
Executive Departme;znt on N.L.R.B. General Counsel's Interpretation of "Aiffecting Cow-
wnerce," 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-44 (1948) ; H.R. REP. No. 2050, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7
(1948).
35. Although no precise figures are available, the low dollar requirements of the
Board's yardsticks do appear to take into account the diversified, small-unit structure of
the industry-especially standards (d), (e), (h), and (i), supra note 9. In additi.n,
computation of the interstate business volume of firms for which construction work is
done would bring a great deal of industrial construction within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB. See (f), (g), supra note 9.
Charges that the Board, by its yardsticks, supra note 9, is excluding most of the
building trades from regulation rests on an unwarranted interpretation of statistics on
the structure of the construction industry. Brief for the Petitioners, p. 57, Joliet Con-
tractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952), claims that 87.2 p rcent of the
establishments in the industry did less than $2,000 worth of business in 1939, thereby
implying that the Board yardsticks cover only a small fraction of the industry. That
statistic is from U.S. DP'T or CommEcE, Bu E.utv OF THE CENSUS, CE2sus o- Busimss,
1939, CoxsTaucrox 1939, Vol. 4, pp. 6, 53 (1945).
An accurate estimate of the scope of Board coverage would have to take into account
current construction costs, and current volume of business. There were about 313,U0D
firms in the construction industry in 1948. U.S. D&'T or L=oR, BUrEAu or Lron
STrTISTCS, MATERLIS ON THE CoNsTRucriox IxnusmvY, Table 8 (Oct. 20, 1949). The
average expenditures per firm in this industry were more than $0,,000 in 1949. Interpola-
tions from U.S. DEP'T OF LAnoR, BL-m.,u or LBOR STATisTics, EXPrDruiTUn.S roa N MY
Cos mucnoN 1915-1950, Table 2 (Aug. 1951). This figure should probably b- revised
upward for 1952, as total new construction expenditures in 1952 were $31,025,000,000, or
an increase of 30 percent over 1948. Ibid. Total expenditures for new construction have
almost quadrupled since 1939, rising from $8,198,000,000 in that year to $,31,025,009,0
in 1951. U.S. DZa"T oF L.,oA, EXPENDITLRES FOR NEv. CO.Is TRIctTIONZ 1915-19-0, Table 2
(Aug. 1951), and supplements thereto for 1951. Expenditures for publicly-financed resi-
dential building increased 131 percent from January, 1951, to January, 1952. Publicly-
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than seventy-five construction industry matters before it since October, 1950.YO
Under Joliet, however, the number of building trades cases could become un-
manageable. The only check would be through the policy of the General
Counsel in issuing complaints. Should such restraint in initiating action also
be treated as an abuse of discretion, the Board could not handle important
matters promptly without recourse to some sort of priority system. It would
then have to allow other matters to languish on the docket, denying effective
relief.
Nor is the Joliet holding necessarily limited to disputes in the building
trades. The court's demand for Board action in the Joliet case may be read
to abolish discretionary jurisdiction in other fields.87 Such a construction
would revive the confusion that developed immediately after Taft-Hartley was
enacted, when the Board attempted to assert jurisdiction beyond its capacity
for effective enforcement.38 Furthermore, such an interpretation would
seriously weaken the power of state labor boards. Post Taft-Hartley cases
suggest that state boards cannot hear disputes in areas customarily handled
by the NLRB.39 Although it is possible that a twilight zone already has been
financed industrial construction was up 130.6 percent in the same period. US. Dret
oF LABoR, CONSTRucrIoN, table 4, p. 7 (Jan. 1952). Public outlay for military and naval
facilities jumped 483.3 percent from January, 1951, to January, 1952. Ibid.
36. Plumbing & Heating Co., 99 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (May 6, 1952) ; Plumbers & Pipe
Fitters, 95 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1951); Brick & Tile Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 15 (1951); Hod
Carriers Local No. 210, 92 N.L.R.B. 93 (1950); Snohomish County Building Material
Ass'n, 92 N.L.R.B. 39 (1950).
37. The Seventh Circuit rests heavily on the following language, which it quotes
twice in the course of its eleven-page opinion: "Whether or no practices may be deemed
by Congress to affect interstate commerce is not to be determined by confining judgment
to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the Board. Appropriate for
judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is representative of many others through-
out the country, the total incidence of which if left unchecked may well become far-
reaching in its harm to commerce." Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643,
648 (1944).
If this "total incidence" view were adopted by the Board, hotels, bars, laundries, and
other local service trades might be included in the area of mandatory Board jurisdiction,
Congress clearly did not intend this result. Hearings before Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare on S. 249, Pt. 4, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1659-1707 (1949); SEN. Rap. No.
986 P'r. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948). And see note 34 supra.
38. In 1948, after a year of operation under Taft-Hartley, and taking virtually all
matters presented to it, the Board had a backlog of over 12,000 cases. See note 34
sup ra.
For an indication of possible Congressional reaction against such a judicial interpreta-
tion, see -SEN. REP. No. 986, PT. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (1948).
39. Federal jurisdiction in this area is exclusive, and once the Board has regulated
an industry, the state board may not thereafter claim jurisdiction. Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947) (NLRB failure to regulate foremen for purposes of certifi-
cation did not open this area to state action) ; LaCrosse Telephone Corp. v. Wis. Employ-
ment Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949) (although no federal action on case at hand, industry
customarily under jurisdiction of NLRB exempt from state regulation). Cf. Penna. Lab.
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created in which the NLRB does not, and the state boards cannot properly,
assert jurisdiction,4 0 such local authorities continue to hear cases falling with-
in the potential power of the NLRB.41 But requiring the NLRB to hear all
cases over which it could exercise jurisdiction would not only magnify the
Board's problem of keeping abreast of its case-load, but wnuld clearly under-
cut most state regulation.4
Aware of its sweeping powers but limited resources, the NLRB seems
better equipped than the courts to maximize the effectiveness of the Labor-
Management Relations Act. Barring an egregious abuse of discretion, courts
should be loath to challenge the Board's jurisdictional decisions. If the
building trades require closer supervision than is practical under existing law,
appropriate remedies should be sought in Congress.
Rel. Ed. v. Frank, 362 Pa. 537, 67 A2d 78 (1949) (state may not act if allegations would
constitute unfair practices under state and federal acts).
This problem is further complicated by a provision in the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. 1952), which provides that the national board
may not cede jurisdiction to a state board unless the state act is substantially similar to
the federal legislation in the applicable sections. Lr~ssLnvrA Hxsmay 432, 500, 556, Z33,
9S6, 1052 (1948).
40. For literature on the conflict bet-ween state and national boards, see: Cox & Seid-
mann, Federalism in Labor Relatfons, 64 HAR-. L. Rm% 211 (1950); Smith, The Taft-
Hartley Act and State Jitrisdiction over Labor Relations, 46 M Crr. L. Rnv. 593 (1943);
Lorenz, Conflict of Jurisdiction between National and State Labor Relations Boards, 2
LAB. L.J. 887 (1951); Lorenz, Conflict of Jurisdiction between Aational and NVew Yorh
State Labor Relations Boards, 5 I urns. & LAB. REi- RLr. 411 (1952) ; SE:.-. R n. No. 926,
Pr. 3, S0th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1948).
41. See, e.g., Waterways Engineering Corp., 30 LAB. RE[. Rr. (Ref. Man.) 1105
(Wis. ERB 1952) ; Wis. Employment Rel. Bd. v. Liquor Salesmen, 29 LAB. R.L. TU.
(Ref. 'Man.) 2538 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1952) ; Mil-aukee Sentinel v. Wis. Empkyinent Rd. Ed.,
29 LA . REu. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2017 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1951); Royal Concourse Co., 29 LUL
RE!. REP. (Ref. 'Man.) 1035 (N.Y. LRB 1951).
42. See note 39 supra.
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